Criminals Now Run Justice System, Warns Global Crime Watchdog at SA Inquiry

Organised crime has burrowed so deep into South Africa’s criminal justice system that the people meant to stop it are, in many cases, helping it survive. That is the central finding of research presented to the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry this week by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC).

Michael Shaw, representing GI-TOC, appeared before the commission on Wednesday to describe criminal networks that have built lasting relationships with police officers, prosecutors, intelligence officials and other state actors. These relationships allow criminals to obtain sensitive information, steer investigations away from themselves and block enforcement efforts. The infiltration, Shaw said, is not scattered or occasional. It is systematic and self-reinforcing.

For ordinary South Africans, the consequences are visible in daily life. Investigations stall. Gunmen are identified but the networks directing them are not. Firearms meant to be in police custody end up in the hands of criminal groups. The country ranks seventh globally for organised crime among 193 nations, second in Africa and first in Southern Africa, according to GI-TOC’s 2025 Global Organised Crime Index. South Africa scored 7.43 on the criminality scale, placing it among the five percent of countries most affected by organised crime worldwide. Of 15 criminal markets assessed, 12 scored six or higher, including drug trafficking, extortion, firearms trafficking and non-renewable resource crimes.

Shaw drew a sharp distinction between isolated corruption and the deeper problem the commission is examining. When a police officer accepts a single payment to make an unlawful decision, that is corruption. When that officer enters an ongoing relationship with a criminal network, providing repeated assistance and access to state resources, that is something else: the systematic capture of a state institution. The distinction matters enormously for how the state responds.

The research cited cases that illustrate how far this capture can reach. Former national police commissioner Jackie Selebi’s alleged relationship with convicted drug trafficker Glenn Agliotti showed how protection for organised crime could operate at the most senior levels. In 2016, former SAPS Colonel Christiaan Prinsloo pleaded guilty to systematically diverting approximately 2,400 police firearms to criminal groups. A subsequent investigation revealed further alleged collusion between police officials and criminal networks to manipulate the Central Firearms Registry and supply guns and firearm licences. Shaw told the commission the actual number of firearms involved was closer to between 7,000 and 9,000.

Meanwhile, the taxi industry presented its own pattern of alleged state entanglement. The Shongwe Commission found that state-issued firearms had been used in taxi violence and that confidential complaints and planned police operations had allegedly been leaked to suspects. Between 2000 and 2025, GI-TOC recorded 2,458 assassinations, attempted assassinations and plots linked to this environment. Investigations routinely fail to move beyond identifying the gunmen to identifying the criminal networks directing the violence.

The current institutional architecture, Shaw argued, cannot adequately address any of this. The Hawks remain inside SAPS rather than operating as an independent body. The Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC) sits within the National Prosecuting Authority and operates with severely limited resources. The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) is structurally separate from SAPS but depends on other criminal justice institutions to enforce the consequences of its findings. The Fusion Centre brings together the NPA, Hawks, SAPS, IPID, Special Investigating Unit, SARS and the State Security Agency, but operates largely through voluntary cooperation and cannot compel agencies to participate or reallocate cases.

GI-TOC proposed a short-term “personnel reset” as the first phase of reform. An independent, time-limited reassessment would evaluate officials across SAPS, Crime Intelligence, the Hawks, NPA, IDAC, IPID, intelligence services and Correctional Services. The initial focus would target institutional heads, senior management and officials in sensitive positions involving intelligence, evidence, firearms, procurement, appointments and disciplinary powers. Officials would face rigorous asset and income disclosures, independent verification of wealth and scrutiny of disciplinary records and complaints, and could ultimately be confirmed, transferred, suspended or dismissed, with criminal or disciplinary referrals where warranted.

Shaw pointed to international precedents. Albania conducted a major judicial vetting programme that reassessed every serving judge and prosecutor. By the completion of its appellate process in 2026, 804 final decisions had been recorded: 348 confirmations, 283 dismissals and 173 terminations of the process, including 114 resignations. Mexico has introduced periodic integrity certification for police, prosecutors, forensic officials and prison personnel, including checks for unexplained wealth and links to criminal organisations.

The longer-term recommendations included amendments to the Prevention of Organised Crime Act to create a specific offence of criminal infiltration of the criminal justice system, and legislation allowing the state to target unexplained wealth through civil asset recovery. GI-TOC’s most significant proposal was the establishment of an independent Anti-Organised Crime Agency as a Chapter 9 institution with constitutionally entrenched structural and operational independence. The agency would investigate organised crime and criminal infiltration of state institutions, access classified information, trace assets and establish joint investigative teams. Shaw proposed it should also carry prosecutorial powers, either independently or jointly with the NPA, which would require an amendment to Section 179 of the Constitution.

Shaw was careful to caution that no single reform would be sufficient. Criminal infiltration exploits mutually reinforcing weaknesses: compromised personnel, fragmented intelligence, weak oversight, political interference and inadequate protection for witnesses and investigators. Replacing compromised officials without changing the systems that enabled them risks reproducing the same problem. The scale of South Africa’s response, he said, must match the scale of the threat. Whether the commission’s eventual recommendations will carry the institutional weight to make that match is the question now hanging over the process.